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Abstract. Outsourcing data in the cloud has become nowadays very
common. Since – generally speaking – cloud data storage and manage-
ment providers cannot be fully trusted, mechanisms providing the con-
fidentiality of the stored data are necessary. A possible solution is to
encrypt all the data, but – of course – this poses serious problems about
the effective usefulness of the stored data. In this work, we propose to
apply a well-known attribute-based cryptographic scheme to cope with
the problem of querying encrypted data. We have implemented the pro-
posed scheme with a real-world, off-the-shelf RDBMS and we provide
several experimental results showing the feasibility of our approach.
1 Introduction
The widespread and ever-growing deployment of cloud computing allows users
to access a wide array of services, such as online data storage. The advantages in
adopting such solutions is mitigated by the fact that outsourced data is not under
the direct control of the legitimate owner, who has uploaded it to the storage
service and one has to fully trust the service provider. As a typical solution, the
data owner encrypts with a classical symmetric scheme its data before uploading
it to the storage provider. This is not optimal in the case the storage manager
– or some other party other than the data owner – has to perform some kind
of computation over the encrypted data. For example, it is impossible to search
for a given content over encrypted data, or, more specifically, in the case of
encrypted structured data (such as relational data), it is not possible to perform
expressive, SQL-like queries. Several solutions have been proposed that solve the
problem of searching over encrypted data. However, most of such solutions are
not well-tailored for performing searches over structured data, such as relational
tables. We refer to Section 2 for a discussion.
Our motivating scenario. Consider a data owner U that collects data coming
from an information source (say, a sensor network) and stores them in a cloud-
based database, managed by a (possibly untrusted) third party. We assume that
the outsourced database is formed by a single table T . In the following we de-
scribe the security requirements related to the collection and querying of such
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data. The information collected in the table T is sensitive and should not be
unconditionally disclosed. Henceforth, in this scenario the solutions typically
adopted for ensuring the confidentiality (and then enforcing proper access poli-
cies to the data) do not apply. In fact, the DBMS is typically demanded to
enforce the access control to the data stored in it, but – since in our case the
DBMS could be untrusted – this solution is not viable. The first few rows of an
instance of the table T are as follows:
ServiceId TypeId Availability Certificate Position Description Timestamp
10 3 yes cert1 District2 infrared camera 2010-09-07 12:45:33
23 3 yes cert2 District3 temperature 2012-12-03 11:52:34
41 1 yes cert3 District3 camera 2012-06-12 07:22:45
12 2 no cert4 District1 camera 2012-04-07 14:33:28
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Furthermore, the data should be accessed by the legitimate users that can
pose standard, select-from-where SQL queries like:
Q1
select ∗
from T
where TypeId = 3
and Position = ” D i s t r i c t 1 ” ;
Q2
select Serv i ce Id , TypeId
from T
where Position = ” D i s t r i c t 1 ”
and A v a i l a b i l i t y = ” yes ” ;
Fig. 1. Two conjunctive SFW queries
As an additional layer of security, the queries themselves are considered sen-
sitive by the data owner U . Points (i), (ii) (iii) are conflicting and to find a
practical and efficient solution satisfying all of them is a challenging task.
In this work, we propose an application-level database encryption technique,
based on an attribute-based cryptographic scheme, for processing obfuscated
selection-projection queries over an encrypted version of the table T , such that:
(i) data owner U stores an encrypted version of the table T on an non-private
(possibly untrusted) RDBMS; (ii) Each user V entitled for running a query Q
over T receives a corresponding decryption key Kq encoding the query. That
is, only users satisfying a given access policy may access data satisfying a cor-
responding query, and only such data. (iii) The data owner issues the decryp-
tion keys in an initial setup phase; (iv) The processing of the query is done by
a trusted, separate query processor. Depending on architectural choices, such
query processor may be under the control of end users, or managed by a trusted
third party, detached from the rdbms server; (v) Data stored in the encrypted
table may be modified by the ownwer U without the need of re-encrypting the
entire table, nor recomputing existing decryption keys. Note that in the proposed
approach, access control is performed by the data owner by safely distributing
to each user entitled to perform a query a corresponding decryption key. The
encryption procedure is completely oblivious of the access control policy and
this is a good feature since data can be encrypted even before potential read-
ers with still to be defined access rights enroll into the system. Specifically, the
addition of new readers does not force the data owner to modify the encryption
of the current data. Given that U wants the encrypted data to be searched by
queries like query Q1 and Q2 stated above, U performs the following operations:
it encrypts the tuples of table T using an attribute-based encryption scheme
that takes as additional input a vector X containing (an encoding of) the values
contained in the tuples. That is, there is a different vector x for every differ-
ent row; this has to be repeated as many times as there are attributes to be
projected. In order to do this, we add a special attribute whose domain ranges
over the indices encoding the positions of attributes; Afterwards, U computes
the corresponding secret restricted decryption keys, that depend on the values
to be searched, encoded in a vector Y ; since the attribute-based cryptographic
scheme obfuscates the search values contained in the vector Y , it is referred to
as hidden vector encryption (or HVE ) scheme. The decryption keys are then
distributed by U (or some other trusted authority) to the users satisfying the
corresponding access policy. This is the last time in which users interact. After
the decryption keys’ distribution, the data owner can go offline. Note that in the
scenario just described the query are entirely defined by the data owner V , that
fixes – among other things – the values to be searched in the table T . However,
in real-world database-backed applications, it is the case that the end user V
may specify the values to be searched filling empty placeholders in an a-priori
defined query. We show that a very simple modification of the proposed scheme
allows the data owner U to issue a “parametric” token K corresponding to a
query with unspecified search values, that are to be provided by the user receiv-
ing such token. Note that the encryption depends on the data contained in the
tuples and decryption keys only depend on the query. Note also that it is possible
to adjoin or delete tuples from the database without the need to re-encrypt its
entire content, but only the modified content has to be re-enciphered. We remark
also that a single encryption of the database is sufficient for answering different
obfuscated queries. The experimental results show that – quite expectedly – the
space overhead for storing the encrypted data grows linearly with the number of
columns of the cleatext database. This linear overhead holds for the execution
time of an encrypted query, as well. The paper is structured as follows: in Section
2 are discussed the most relevant related works; in Section 3, a simplified version
of the attribute-based encryption scheme of Okamoto and Takashima suitable
for our context is presented; in Section 4 we show how to use the above men-
tioned scheme for executing obfuscated SQL queries over an encrypted database;
in Section 5 the main functional components of an architecture implementing
our approach are presented; in Section 6 the results of the experiments with our
implementation are shown; finally, in Section 7 the conclusions are drawn, along
with a description of future extensions we are already working on.
2 Related works
The ever-growing adoption of cloud-based data storage and management service
has prompted several research efforts aiming at assuring an high security level of
the stored data using cryptographic mechanisms that do not assume the service
to be trusted. The problem of how to provide an adequate security level to the
stored data by deploying cryptographic techniques has been addressed by the
database research community as well as the cryptographic research community,
each of them focusing on different aspects that are relevant for the respective
community. See, for example, the scenarios described in [1].
There are several works in the database literature that deal with encrypted
databases. Seminal works like [2] and [3] have underlined the need to devise
novel mechanisms that complement the usual access control approaches in order
to achieve a greater level of security, by storing an encrypted version of the data,
as well as the need to devise efficient indexing techniques that allow reasonable
query performance over encrypted data. The advent of fast networks and cheap
online storage has made viable the management of encrypted data at application-
level. One of the first works to present the paradigm database-as-a-service is [4].
In [5] a database architecture based on a trusted hardware cryptographic mod-
ule is presented. In [6], the authors propose a full-fledged system for performing
sql queries over an encrypted database. Compared to such works, our approach
is far less complex – albeit with admittedly less search functionalitiesc– while
offering a strong degree of security. All the major commercial RDBMS releases
provide functionalities to encrypt the data they store, see for example [7]. All
commercial solutions are based on database-level encryption, thus limiting the
functionalities over encrypted data, that have to be deciphered at server side in
order to processing queries over them. Apart from encryption techniques to deal
with large quantities of data that are to be managed and searched over, issues
like key management and indexes over encrypted data have been addressed In
[8], [9] are presented two short surveys of the major challenges that are relevant
to the design of encrypted database as well as useful reference architectures. In
the cryptographic (and more broadly, security) research community, the problem
of how to query an an encrypted database has been viewed as a (very relevant)
example of the broader problem of computing over encrypted data. As it is well
known, the first general, fully homomorphic encryption scheme has been defined
in [10]. However, it is too impractical to be applied to real-world scenarios and a
very active research area in cryptography is to find Therefore, more specialized
techniques have been proposed in order to solve the (less general) problem of
searching over encrypted data. One of the first works addressing the problem
is [11], in which the authors define a public key scheme that – given a search
keyword – allows for the creation of a corresponding decryption key that tests
whether such keyword is contained in the ciphertext. A subsequent work has
introduced the notion of hidden vector encryption, in which it is possible to
pose conjunctive and range queries over encrypted data in suh a way that the
query is itself obfuscated [12]. Among the many works based on homomorphic
encryption, we mention [13], that uses a “limited” (yet more efficient) version
of homomorphic encryption to query an encrypted repository. We point out
though that homomorphic encyrption is at the moment very inefficient and thus
the approaches based on it cannot be considered practical. A similar approach to
ours is described in [14], where the authors propose an attribute-based encryp-
tion scheme for keyword searching over unstructured textual data, along with
a mechanism for proving the truthfulness of the search results. An extensive
amount of work has been done concerning how to access data without disclosing
sensitive information using anonymous credentials see for example [15] and [16].
Finally, a related area is private information retrieval in which the goal is to
preserve the privacy of queries. That is retrieve information from a database
(typically represented as an unstructured sequence of bits) without letting the
database know anything about the query [17]. While it is a very interesting ap-
proach from a theoretical point of view, its practical applicability is rather scarce
and it only allows very simple queries (like retrieving a cell in a table) and does
not enforce any control on what is accessed.
The approach presented in this work takes inspiration from attribute-based
encryption schemes as defined, for example, in [18] or [12]. However, since such
schemes are optimized for a binary alphabet and thus not very efficient over lager
alphabets, such as those found in practice. The techincal core of our contribution
is a novel encryption scheme for HVE [19] that is based on the dual pairing vector
space abstraction of [20] (which supports very large alphabets) and allows for
an efficient amortized way of encrypting the rows of a table in such a way that
selection-projection queries on encyrpted data can be easily performed. A self-
contained presentation of the cryptographic tool we develop is found in Section
3.
3 The cryptographic scheme constructions
In this section we describe our construction of HVE. We start by describing the
dual pairing vector space framework (the DPVS framework) of [20].
3.1 Dual Pairing Vector Space
In the DPVS framework, we have an additive group (G, 0) and a multiplicative
group (GT , 1T ) of the same prime size q and a bilinear map e : G × G → GT .
That is, for a, b, c ∈ G, we have
e(a+ b, c) = e(a, c) · e(b, c) and e(a, b+ c) = e(a, b) · e(a, c)
and
e(0, a) = 1T and e(a, 0) = 1T .
The above imply that for all s, t ∈ Fq we have
e(s · a, t · b) = e(a, b)st.
The bilinear map is extended to vectors over G as follows. For two vectors
X = (x1, . . . , xn) and Y = (y1, . . . , yn) over G, define
e(X,Y ) =
n∏
i=1
e(xi, yi).
Note the abuse of notation by which we use e to denote the bilinear map defined
over G and over the vector space over G. Also, we observe that the extended
bilinear map e is still bilinear in the sense that
e(X + Y,Z) = e(X,Z) · e(Y,Z) and e(X,Z + Y ) = e(X,Z) · e(X,Y )
for all vectors X,Y, Z.
For a fixed g ∈ G, we define the canonical base A1, . . . , An with respect to g
where, for i = 1, . . . , n,
Ai = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, g, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−i
).
Notice that
e(Ai, Ai) = e(g, g) and i 6= j ⇒ e(Ai, Aj) = 1T .
Let B and B? be two n × n matrices with columns B = (B1, . . . , Bn) and
B∗ = (B?1 , . . . , B
?
n) and let ψ ∈ Fq. We say that (B,B?) is a pair of ψ-orthogonal
matrices if, for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n,
e(Bi, B
?
i ) = g
ψ
T and e(Bi, B
?
j ) = 1T ,
where we set gT = e(g, g). A pair of ψ-orthogonal matrices can be constructed
as follows. Let X = (xi,j), X
? = (x?i,j) ∈ Fn×nq be matrices such that
XT ·X? = ψ · I.
for i = 1, . . . , n, vectors Bi and B
?
i are defined as follows
Bi =
n∑
j=1
xi,jAj and B
?
i =
n∑
j=1
x?i,jAj .
For a vector (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fq and a matrix B = (B1, . . . , Bn), we define the
vector
(x1, . . . , xn)B =
n∑
i=1
xiBi.
3.2 HVE in the DPVS framework
In this section we first define the concept of an HVE encryption scheme and
then give an implementation using the DPVS framework.
The HVE function over F`q is defined as follows: for X = (x1, . . . , x`) ∈ F`q
and Y = (y1, . . . , y`) ∈ (Fq ∪ {?})`, we define
HVE(X,Y ) = 1 iff ∀i yi 6= ?⇒ xi = yi.
Definition 1. An HVE encryption scheme is a quadruple of algorithms HVE =
(Setup,Encrypt, KeyGen, Decrypt) with the following syntax:
1. The Setup algorithm takes integers q and ` and returns a master public key
MPK and a master secret key MSK.
2. The Encrypt algorithm takes a plaintext M , an attribute vector X = (x1, . . . , x`) ∈
F`q and a master public key MPK and returns a ciphertext Ct.
3. The KeyGen algorithm takes an attribute vector Y = (y1, . . . , y`) ∈ (Fq ∪
{?})` and master key MSK returns a key K for Y .
4. The Decrypt algorithm takes a ciphertext Ct for plaintext m and attribute
vector X computed using master public key MPK and a key K for attribute
vector Y computed using master secret key MSK and returns the value m iff
HVE(X,Y ) = 1.
We are now ready to describe our implementation HVE of an HVE encryption
scheme. We assume that a DPSV framework (G,GT , e, q) is given.
1. Setup(`). Randomly choose ψ ∈ Fq and g ∈ G and set gT = e(g, g)ψ. For
i = 0, . . . , ` generate a pair (Bi, Ci) of ψ-orthogonal 3× 3 matrices. Return
MPK = (B0, . . . , B
`, gT ) and MSK = (C
0, . . . , C`).
2. Encrypt(m,X,MPK). We assume m ∈ GT and X = (x1, . . . , x`) ∈ F`q.
Randomly choose z, w0, . . . , w` ∈ Fq, set
c = gzT ·m and c0 = (w0, z, 0)B0
and, for t = 1, . . . , `, set
ct = (wt, wt · xt, w0)Bt .
Return Ct = (c, c0, c1, . . . , c`).
3. KeyGen(Y,MSK). Assume Y = (y1, . . . , y`) ∈ (Fq ∪ {?})` and let S be the
set of 1 ≤ t ≤ ` such that yt 6= ?.
Pick random η ∈ Fq and, for t ∈ S, pick random dt, st ∈ Fq and set s0 =
−∑t∈S st. Set
k0 = (s0, 1, η)C0 and kt = (dt · yt,−dt, st)Ct .
Return K = (k0, (kt)t∈S).
4. Decrypt(K,Ct). Write K as K = (k0, (kt)t∈S) and Ct as Ct = (c, c0, . . . , c`).
Return
c
e(k0, c0) ·
∏
i∈S e(ki, ci)
.
Let us now show that our scheme is correct.
Suppose that HVE(X,Y ) = 1. Then by the ψ-orthogonality of B0 and C0 we
have
e(k0, c0) = g
s0·w0+z
T .
Moreover, the ψ-orthogonality of Bi and ci gives
e(kt, ct) = g
dt·wt·(xt−yt)+w0·st
T .
Therefore if xt = yt for t ∈ S we have∏
t∈S
e(kt, ct) = g
w0·
∑
t∈S st
T = g
−s0·w0
T
which implies that the Decrypt algorithm returns m. On the other hand if xt 6= yt
for some t ∈ S the Decrypt algorithm returns a random value in GT .
For security we observe that a ciphertext for plaintextm with attribute vector
X does not reveal any information on m and on attribute vector X. On the other
hand, no security guarantee is made for a key K.
3.3 An amortized scheme
In our construction of secure database queries we will often have to encrypt
n messages m1, . . . ,mn ∈ GT with closely related attributes. More specifically,
message mj is encrypted with attributes (x1, . . . , x`, x
j
`+1) ∈ F`+1q ; that is, the
attributes of two messages coincide except for the (`+ 1)-st. If we use the HVE
implementation of the previous section, the sum of the sizes of the ciphertexts
of all messages is Θ(` · n). In this section we describe a scheme that reduces the
size to Θ(`+ n).
1. Setupam. Same as Setup.
2. Encram(m1, . . . ,mn ∈ GT , x1, . . . , x`, x1`+1, . . . , xn`+1,MPK).
Randomly choose z, w0, . . . , w` ∈ Fq and set
c0 = (w0, z, 0)B0 and ct = (wt, wt · xt, w0)Bt for t = 1, . . . , `.
The encryption of the j-th message mj is computed as follows: Pick random
zj , wj , wj0 ∈ Fq and set
cj = gz+z
j
T ·mj
and
cj0 = (w
j
0, z
j , 0)B0,? and c
j
`+1 = (w
j , wj · xj`+1, wj0)B`+1 .
The cumulative ciphertext consists of
Ct = (c0, c1, . . . , c`, (c
1, c10, c
1
`+1), . . . , (c
n, cn0 , c
n
`+1)).
The ciphertext corresponding to mj is
Ctj = (c0, c1, . . . , c`, (c
j , cj0, c
j
`+1)).
3. KeyGenam(Y,MSK).
Write Y as Y = (y1, . . . , y`, y`+1) and let S be the set of 1 ≤ t ≤ ` such that
yt 6= ?. We assume that y`+1 6= ? and we stress that `+ 1 6∈ S.
Randomly choose η ∈ Fq and, for t ∈ S, randomly choose dt, st ∈ Fq and set
s0 = −
∑
t∈S st. Set
k0 = (s0, 1, η)C0 and kt = (dt · yt,−dt, st)Ct .
Randomly choose s?0, η
?, d`+1 ∈ Fq and output
k?0 = (s
?
0, 1, η
?)C0,? and k`+1 = (d`+1 · y`+1,−d`+1,−s?0)C`+1 .
Return key K
K = (k0, (kt)t∈S , k?0 , k`+1).
4. Decryptam(K,Ct). WriteK = (k0, (kt)t∈S , k?0 , k`+1) and Ct = (c0, c1, . . . , c`, (c
j , cj0, c
j
`+1)
n
j=1).
Compute mj as
cj
e(cj0, k
?
0) · e(cj`+1, k`+1) · e(c0, k0) ·
∏
t∈S e(ct, kt)
.
For correctness, suppose HVE(X,Y ) = 1. By the ψ-orthogonality we have
e(c0, k0) = g
s0·w0+z
T .
and, for t ∈ S
e(ct, kt) = g
st·w0
T .
Therefore ∏
t∈S
e(ct, kt) = g
∑
t∈S st·w0
T = g
−s0·w0
T .
and thus
e(c0, k0) ·
∏
t∈S
e(ct, kt) = g
z
T .
Moreover we have
e(cj0, k
?
0) = g
s?0 ·wj0+zj
T and e(c
j
`+1, k`+1) = g
−s?0 ·wj0
T
and thus
e(cj0, k
?
0) · e(cj`+1, k`+1) = gz
j
T .
4 Private queries
In this section we describe how a table is encrypted using the HVE scheme of
Section 3. Let us start by fixing our notation.
We assume that data owner U holds table T , composed of l columnsA1, . . . , Al
and of u rows R1, . . . , Ru and we write the i-th row Ri as Ri = 〈v1i , . . . , vil〉.
Encrypting a table. We assume that the data owner U has selected a DPVS
framework with groups of size q and an authenticated private-key block cipher
ABC = (E,D) with key length k < q.
1. Generating the system parameters.
U runs algorithm Setupam(q, l) and obtains a pair of master public and secret
key (MPK,MSK).
2. Encrypting row R = 〈v1, . . . , vl〉.
U picks l random keys k1, . . . , kl for ABC and use them to encrypt R. Specif-
ically, compute R˜ = 〈v˜1, . . . , v˜l〉, where v˜i = E(ki, vi) for i = 1, . . . , l.
Then U encrypts keys ki using the HVE scheme. Specifically, for i = 1, . . . , l,
U computes k˜ by setting
k˜ = Encryptam(k1, . . . , kl, v1, . . . , vl, 1, . . . , l,MPK).
That is, key ki is encrypted with attribute vector (v1, . . . , vl, i).
The encryption of row R consists of the pair (R˜, k˜) and the encrypted table
is simply the sequence T˜ = 〈(R˜1, k˜1), . . . , (R˜u, k˜u)〉 of the encrypted rows.
Generating a key for a selection-projection query. A typical selection-projection
query (like Q2 in Figure 1 “select ServiceId, TypeId from T where Position =
‘District1’ and Availability = ‘yes’ ”) is described by specifying the search values,
along with “don’t care” entries ?, and the columns that are to be projected in
the corresponding attribute vectors (one for every column to be projected).
More specifically, consider a query that specifies value ai for i = 1, . . . , l (it
is possible that ai = ? for some values i corresponding to don’t care entries in
the query) and column c to be projected. We assume without loss of generality
that only one columns is to be projected; in general one computes a different
key for each column to be projected. For example, a selection-only query, like
query Q1:“select * from T where TypeId = 3 and Position = ‘District 1’ ”,
is a special case of selection-projection query in which all the columns of the
table are to be projected. The key for such a query is obtained by running the
procedure described below with c = 1, . . . , l.
The data owner U releases keyK for the queryQ1 by running KeyGenam(Y,MSK)
for attribute vector Y = (a1, . . . , al, c) and using master secret key MSK com-
puted as part of the generation of the system parameter generation. The key K
is then sent to an user V entitled to execute the query.
We point out that in the description above we have implictly assumed that
values ai are elements of the field Fq or ?. This does not hold in general as in
most applications values ai are strings over an alphabet; thus we derive values
ai by applying an hash function that for each string returns an element of Fq.
Executing a selection-projection query. Upon receiving key K, the user V ap-
plies K to the encrypted table as follows. For i = 1, . . . , u, row i (R˜i, k˜i) of
the encrypted table is used to compute kˆic by selecting the c-th output of the
Decryptam algorithm on input K and k˜i. Key kˆic is then used to run the decryp-
tion algorithm D for ABC to decrypt vˆic. If the decryption algorithm succeeds
then it returns vic. Otherwise the row is not selected.
Indeed, if the key attribute vector of K matches the attribute vector used to
obtain k˜i then this means that row i is to be selected and thus kˆic = k
i
c and the
decryption algorithm Decryptam does not fail. If instead the key attribute vector
of the key K does not match the attribute vector of the row (that is, the row is
not to be selected) then kˆic is a random element of GT and thus with very high
probability the decryption algorithm fails.
4.1 Parametric queries
In the previous sections, we have assumed that the data owner, in constructing
the key K, completely determines the query that can be run over the encrypted
database. That is, the values that are to be searched (and their correspond-
ing columns) and the columns that are to be returned. However, in real-world,
database-backed applications what usually happens is that the user asking for
the query execution has the ability to fix by itself the values to be searched.
Specifically, the data owner might want to be able to generate a key that allows
to search a specified column (or set of columns) for values to be specified later.
We remark that the way tokens are computed by the KeyGen procedure easily
allows for a two-step computation of a token encoding a given query: namely,
the first step is performed by the data owner which computes an intermedi-
ate, “parametric” decryption key; the second step then consists in specifying
the parameters into the parametric decryption key thus obtaining a complete
decryption key. More precisely, we observe that the computation of decryption
key components kt, for 1 ≤ t ≤ l (the ones that depend on the values to be
searched (see Section 3) can be performed by the following modified version of
the KeyGenam:
KeyGenampar: The decryption key is computed by a two-step process: (i) for ev-
ery decryption key K, for t ∈ S, pick random st, dt from Fq and set kt =
(dt,−dt, st)Ct (k0 is defined as in KeyGenam); (ii) multiply element-wise the vec-
tor kt (which is composed by three elements) with the vector (yt, 1, 1), obtaining
the component kt of the decryption key K.
We note that Steps (i) and (ii) may be performed by different entities. In
fact, with respect to Query Q2, following Step 1 user U computes the para-
metric decryption keys K1, K2 that correspond to the parametric query “select
columns ServiceId and TypeId of all the rows of the table T such that columns
Availability and Position contain values ‘value1’ and ‘value2’ respectively”. A
(possibly different) user V then after having received K1, K2 from U , computes
the decryption keys K1, K2 by specifying values y1, y2 corresponding to search
values ‘yes’, ‘District3 ’. In other words the data owner U can delegate restricted
search capabilities to user V .
For the security we observe that the parametric key does not allow to generate
keys other than the ones that can be obtained by specifying the values of the
parameters.
5 Architectural Overview
The high-level overview of the architecture (as shown in Figure 2) assumes that
there are users V , V ′, . . ., a data owner U , and a server split in two components:
a query processor P hosted on a trusted, separate application server, and a
(possibly untrusted) DBMS server S. The encryption and decryption operations
are thus delegated outside the DBMS server (compare with, for example, with
the application-level architecture in the taxonomy presented in [9]). For sake of
simplicity, we assume that the data owner U generates the public parameters, as
well as the key material deployed in the execution of the cryptographic schemes
described in the previous sections 4.
Also, we assume that the proxy query processor P (whose task is to decrypt
the (parts of the) rows having matching values with the encryption attribute
vector) communicates with the other components via secure and authenticated
channels. Confidentiality of both data and queries hold as long as the proxy
P and the server S do not collude. We now illustrate the workflow occurring
among the data owner, the trusted proxy query processor, the untrusted server
and users who wish to pose queries to the encrypted database. We consider the
non-amortized case, being the amortized one rather similar in the sequence of
actions to be performed.
Enc(T )
DataOwner U
Query Processor
Untrusted
DBMS
User V
tkQ
Q
Ans(Q)
TrustedApplication Server
Fig. 2. The high-level architecture
The data owner U runs the Setup procedure (see Section 3), producing the
secret master key C0, . . . , Cl and the public key gT = e(g, g)
ψ, B0, . . . , Bl, u
randomly generates the secret ABC keys k1, . . . , ku, as well . U then encrypts
the table in two steps: (i) rows are encrypted with symmetric scheme ABC and
4 As a more realistic setting, we may assume that the tokens are generated by users
having proper credentials or by other trusted third parties that check such credentials
K A1 Al
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QueryGen
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E(Ans(Qok))
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Fig. 3. The query processor structure
(ii) the corresponding secret keys are encrypted with the public keys using the
HVE-based Encrypt procedure. The encrypted database Enc(T ) (composed of
the ABC-encrypted rows and the HVE-encrypted ABC keys and an additional
column that stores a row counter) is uploaded in the untrusted DBMS server.
Afterwards, given a query Q, U proceeds in computing the corresponding token
tkQ, using the secret master key and the the vector containing the values specified
in the query Q). Finally, the decryption key KQ is sent to the query processor. At
this point, the data owner u may go offline. Upon receiving a request from user
V for executing query Q, The proxy query processor P performs the following
steps (see Figure 3):
(i) retrieve with a table scan from the encrypted database (stored in the servers
S) the columns containing the row counter and the HVE-encrypted ABC keys
(which we denote I and KHV E, respectively) from the encrypted database;
(ii) execute the procedure Decrypt with KQ on each HVE-encrypted ABC key in
KHV E; for every successfully decrypted AES key, put the corresponding
value of the row counter into Iok; put the deciphered ABC keys in KHV Eok;
(iii) execute the following SQL query over the encrypted database:
Qok = select ∗ fromE(T ) where I in Iok
(iv) retrieve the answer Ans(Qok);
(v) decipher the ABC-encrypted rows in Ans(Qok) with the keys in KHV Eok;
(vi) send the deciphered rows to the issuer of query Q
The case of parametric queries. Note that the workflow presented in the previous
section requires that the query Q to be fully specified by the data owner. In
particular, U knows the value(s) to be searched. In reality, what happens – as
already explained in Section 4.1 – is that user V specifies the search values in a
query Q, provided by the data owner U . The architecture just presented allows
as well for the execution of a query following the steps specified in Section 4.1:
the data owner U sends the parametric token ¯tkQ to the proxy P . When user V
wants to execute the query Q, it sends (along with s proper request) the vector Y
(containing the values to be searched) to P , that uses it to form the decryption
key KQ.
6 Experimental evaluation
We now describe the experimental results of the application of the schema pre-
sented in Section 3 and 4. We implemented the schemes presented in Section
3 in Python, using the Charm library5, using the relational database SQLite6.
Charm is a Python-based library that offers support for the rapid prototyping
and experimentation of cryptographic schemes. In particular, we rely on the sup-
port offered by Charm for dealing with pairings, which is in turn based on the
well-known C library PBC7. The implementation has been tested on a machine
with a 2-core 2GHz Intel Core i7 processor with 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 RAM,
running OS X 10.9.1.
Asymptotic complexity. Tables 1 and 2 show the complexities of the procedures
presented respectively in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3. The operations we take
into account in measuring time complexity are: pairings (denoted as P ), expo-
nentiations in GT (denoted as EGT ), row products (denoted RW , see Point 6
in Section 3). As for space complexity, we denote with |g| and |gT | the size of
elements in G and GT . Given a SWF query to be privately executed over an
encrypted version of table T , we remind that c, t anc l respectively denote the
number of projected columns in the select clause, the number of columns in the
table T , specified in the from clause and the number of search predicates in the
where clause.
number of operations output size
Setup 1 · P |gT |+ 18l · |g|
Enc EGT + (l + 1) ·RW |gT |+ 10l · |g|
KeyGen (t + 1) ·RW 3(t + 1) · |g|
Dec 3(t + 1) · P
Table 1. Asymptotic complexity of non-amortized scheme
5 http://www.charm-crypto.com/Main.html
6 http://www.sqlite.org
7 http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
number of operations output size
Setup 1 · P |gT |+ 18l · |g|
Enc l · EGT + (l2 + l) ·RW |gT |+ 13l · |g|
KeyGen c(t + 1) ·RW 3(t + 3) · |g|
Dec 3c(t + 1) · P
Table 2. Asymptotic complexity of amortized scheme
Executions with real data. We have executed several tests on datasets of growing
sizes, deploying different curve parameters. More precisely, we have generated
three synthetic relational tables of size 234, 554, 463, 999 and 934, 347 bytes
respectively; we have encrypted them at row level with AES and subsequently
we have encrypted the corresponding 256-bit AES keys with HVE-IP using as
curves parameters MNT159 (G1, G2
8, GT elements’ bitsizes are respectively 159,
477, 954), SS512 (G1, G2, GT elements’ bitsizes are respectively 512, 512, 1024)
and MNT224 (with G1, G2, GT elements’ bitsizes of 224, 672, 1344) MNT159
parameters have a security level equivalent to 954-bit DLOG, while SS512 and
MNT have security levels equivalent respectively to 1024 and 1344-bit DLOG.
In Figure 4, are shown the execution times of encrypted queries corresponding,
respectively, to the following SQL queries with search conditions of increasing
length:
(i) select * from T where ServiceId = 42;
(ii) select * from T where ServiceId = 42 and TypeId = 3;
(iii) select * from T where ServiceId = 42 and TypeId = 3 and Availability
= ‘no’;
As it is expected, for a given row in the cleartext table, the encryption execu-
tion time linearly depends on the number of table columns and the major time
cost is due to the computation of pairings. The queries have been performed on
the largest database. We remind that an encrypted query execution is composed
of the following steps (see Section 5): (i) retrieve from the encrypted database
the rows index and the the hve-ip-encrypted aes keys, (ii) for every retrieved
encrypted key, run the decryption procedure with the attribute vector encoding
the query and, for each key that has a successful match, store the corresponding
row index in the index result set Iok, (iii) retrieve from the encrypted database
the aes- encrypted rows whose row indexes are contained in Iok, (iv) finally,
decipher the rows with the corresponding aes keys that have been successfully
decrypted in Step (iii). In Figure 5, the space overhead of the encrypted database
is shown, resulting from the AES encryption of the data stored in the plaintext
database and the subsequent encryption of the corresponding AES keys using
HVE-IP. Again as expected, the expansion factor linearly depends on the num-
ber of columns employed by the HVE-IP encryption procedure. With respect
to the datasets used in the experiments, the expansion factor of the hve-ip en-
cryption is roughly 5.5. Such factor is directly proportional on the number of
columns in the cleartext database schema – as already pointed out in Table 2
8 In this case, the pairing is asymmetric
– and inversely proportional to the size of the cleartext database. This is due,
of course, to the fact that values in the cleartext database (which can be of
arbitrary size) are mapped to Fq elements (which are of fixed size). As a rule of
thumb for decreasing the size of the encrypted database, one should limit the
columns on which the encryption depends only on the ones that are actually
involved in the search predicates.
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7 Conclusions
In this work we have presented an attribute-based encryption scheme based
on the DPVS framework and we have used it to define a system for privately
query with standard SQL conjunctive queries an encrypted, off-the-shelf, non-
private relational database without the need to decipher the stored data during
the execution of the intermediate query processing steps. We have implemented
our scheme using a standard relational RDBMS, and we provide experimental
results that show the feasibility of our approach. Regarding the extensions of
the present work, we are currently finishing a full-fledged implementation in C
in a client-server architecture, that will provide us more realistic experimental
results. also, we are currently working on privately executing (i) join queries
and (ii) aggregate queries on encrypted tables. Also, we are investigating ways
for deploying indexes in order to avoid full table scans; also we plan to add
mechanisms for verifying whether the query processor has faithfully executed
the query.
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